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findings suggest that lack of long-term funding support, ineffective state 
funding mechanisms, and competition from state programs and new CSOs 
have resulted in perpetual uncertainty for some CSOs. In  all,  these institu­
tional problems may have the potential to shrink, destabilize, and limit the 
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democratization may have simultaneously produced new opportunities for 
some CSOs, yet reinforced unequal power relations for other CSOs and thus 
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Introduction 
As noted by key studies, civil society organizations1 (CSOs) have increased 
across the world (Lewis 2001; Salamon 2010). Similarly, the growth of CSOs in 
South Africa has been rapid with over 85,000 registered CSOs (Department of 
Social Development 2012b). South African CSOs contribute $1.7 billion annually 
to the economy, accounting for 1.3% of the country’s GDP (Swilling, Russell, and 
Habib 2002). Although South African civil society is small when compared to 
North America and Western Europe,2 South African civil society is the largest in 
Africa and second largest in the Global South (Salamon, Sokolowski, and List 
2004). 
However, the growth of CSOs has not ensured that the sector is strong, as 
South African CSOs remain significantly polarized by race and income 
(Warshawsky 2013, 2014). While the demise of apartheid increased democratic 
representation within South Africa, CSOs have been confronted with lack of 
financial and human resources and at times, an antagonistic central state3 
(Camay and Gordon 2001; Umhlaba Development Services 2005). Although 
these problems are sometimes attributed to the growing pains of a young 
democracy, others argue that these struggles point to fundamental institutional 
challenges and limited impacts of CSOs in South Africa (Bond 2006; Desai 2002). 
These scholars contend that there is a direct relationship between the sector’s 
size and its fragmentation and ineffectiveness, as societal inequality has both 
facilitated the growth of CSOs yet also limited their capacity to operate. As noted 
by numerous key scholars (Bratton 1989; Swilling, Russell, and Habib 2002; 
Young 2000, 2006), CSOs maintain important roles to both supplement state 
programs and ensure state accountability. Yet, although more than one billion 
Rand is spent each year to fund South African CSOs (Swilling et al. 2004), it is 
unclear whether CSOs are capable of producing expected outcomes to reduce 
poverty, empower neighborhoods, and democratically represent communities. 
While the state, private sector, and CSOs all vie to maximize their institutional 
autonomy in relation to each other (Bratton 1989), CSOs are arguably in the 
1 African civil society is a fluid, relational, and socially constructed concept historicized in local
 
contexts (Tostensen, Tvedten, and Vaa 2001).
 
2 These countries often have civil societies with 2–3 times the percentage contribution to
 
country GDP (Salamon, Sokolowski, and List 2004).
 
3 The state is a product of the country’s colonial and apartheid history (Terreblanche 2002).
 
While it has devolved governance to local institutions (Rogerson 2004), state formation reflects
 
the complexities of extreme socio-spatial segregation unique to South Africa (Pieterse et al.
 
2008).
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weakest position, since they rely so heavily on funding from other institutions 
(Swilling, Russell, and Habib 2002; Warshawsky 2014). 
Through an in-depth case study of a historically prominent CSO named 
Operation Hunger (OH), this paper critically analyzes the institutional chal­
lenges faced by CSOs in South Africa. To this end, two research questions 
drive this study. First, what is the organizational structure of OH, and how has 
this contributed to its current institutional crisis? Second, what do these findings 
suggest about the viability of South African CSOs more broadly? To answer these 
research questions, this paper analyzes key institutional reports from 1980 to 
2012 and in-depth interview data from 2007 to 2012. This includes interviews of 
administrators, managers, fieldworkers, and community stakeholders working at 
OH, government departments, private donors, and partner CSOs. 
Overall, data in this paper point to problematic findings. Given that OH has 
operated for over three decades, OH represents an outlier or best case scenario 
CSO in South Africa, since most CSOs never last more than a few years. However, 
as discussed in this paper, severe institutional challenges,4 including lack of 
long-term donor support for welfare-oriented projects or human capital, ineffec­
tive state funding mechanisms, and competition from state programs and new 
CSOs, have forced OH to the brink of closure. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After discussing the history of state– 
CSO relations in South Africa, post-apartheid CSOs in South Africa, and methods 
used, this paper critically analyzes OH as a case study. While OH does not reflect 
the entirety of CSOs in South Africa, findings point to institutional problems 
which may impact the sector at large. 
The history of state–civil society relations in 
South Africa 
South African CSOs reflect the diversity of African, European, and Asian peoples 
who have inhabited the country over the centuries. Although these groups 
interacted at times, racist policies and uneven financial support ensured that 
CSOs would be polarized, fragmented, and unstable (Greenstein, Heinrich, and 
Naidoo 1998). During the apartheid regime from 1948 to 1994, polarization of 
CSOs was especially pronounced as the apartheid state encouraged white-run 
CSOs and systematically suppressed non-white CSOs, especially those 
4 Institutional challenges are defined as issues that weaken the financial sustainability, mis­
sion, programs, or structure of an organization (Swilling, Russell, and Habib 2002). 
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associated with unions or political movements (Swilling, Russell, and Habib 
2002). After the 1976 Soweto uprising, CSOs played important social service and 
community organizing roles as part of the anti-apartheid movement. Increased 
involvement of young activists and international resources empowered CSOs in 
the anti-apartheid struggle (Habib and Taylor 1999). 
With the development of a democratic South Africa in 1994, the post-apart­
heid state started to incorporate and institutionalize CSOs (Habib 2005). In 
particular, through the passage of new policies, including the 1996 Growth, 
Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR), 1998 White Paper on Local 
Government, and 2000 Municipal Systems Act, the South African state devolved 
and decentralized key economic and poverty functions to local institutions 
(Department of Finance 1996; Department of Provincial and Local Government 
2000; Republic of South Africa 1998b). These policies have promoted local 
economic development (LED) through a process of integrated development 
planning (IDP) that balances economic growth and poverty alleviation, empha­
sizes local control and flexibility, and includes institutions across scales and 
sectors (Rogerson 2004). Through the Nonprofit Organisations Act of 1997, 
Lotteries Act of 1997, and National Development Agency Act of 1998 (Republic 
of South Africa 1997a, 1997b, 1998a), the South African government formally 
institutionalized CSOs into society. 
However, while the state decentralized state powers to break apart apartheid 
institutions and increase local control, these shifts have increasingly placed 
pressure on CSOs to reduce inequality and promote development (Bond 2000). 
In addition, according to recent studies (Camay and Gordon 2001; Swilling, 
Russell, and Habib 2002), CSOs have been forced to find new funding sources, 
hire skilled staff, and reinvent organizational mission, as apartheid era flows of 
money and people to CSOs ended once the apartheid regime imploded in 1994. 
Moreover, antagonism between the state and CSOs has increased, as many CSOs 
have become dissatisfied with the state’s registration processes, funding 
mechanisms, and development course. In this way, both the state and CSOs 
have seen each other as competing powers or bureaucracies struggling over the 
future of South Africa (Bratton 1989; Young 2000, 2006). 
Most recently from 2007 to 2012, state–CSO tensions have flared over recent 
registration changes and policy shifts initiated by the Department of Social 
Development (DSD). While the national Nonprofit Organisation (NPO) Register 
is always in flux due to turnover, the DSD has taken an active approach to 
ensure NPO compliance (Bok 2012; Department of Social Development 2012a). In 
early 2012, this resulted in the forced deregistration of 23,000 NPOs and flagged 
non-compliant status of 35,000 NPOs (Barnard 2013). According to the DSD, 
these 58,000 organizations failed to provide the paperwork required by law. 
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However, numerous complaints regarding the nature of this deregistration pro­
cess resulted in the re-registration of all organizations in February 2013 on the 
condition that organizations provided paperwork within six months. 
Due to this deregistration crisis, the DSD is developing a new Policy 
Framework on Nonprofit Organisations Law to codify important changes to 
NPO registration and oversight procedures (Department of Social Development 
2012b). This includes the creation of the South African Nonprofit Organisations 
Regulatory Authority (SANPORA) to register, monitor, guide, sanction, and 
prosecute non-compliant Organisations. While the major goals of the 1997 
Nonprofit Organisations Act were to develop a supportive and enabling institu­
tional environment, the Policy Framework on Nonprofit Organisations Law 
emphasizes enforcement and regulation of registered NPOs. Since this law is 
only a working document at this point, it is unclear how the policy will be 
finalized. In the meantime, many activists and legal scholars are concerned 
about its implications given its potentially punitive orientation (Wyngaard 2013). 
Conceptualizing post-apartheid civil society in 
South Africa 
Due to the persistence of socio-economic inequality and lack of confidence in 
the state to improve people’s lives, CSOs have grown rapidly since 1994 (Ballard 
et al. 2006; Desai 2002). According to DSD, 85,039 registered NPOs exist as of 
June 2012 (Department of Social Development 2012b), almost double the number 
from 2006. As the largest in Africa and second largest in the Global South, South 
African CSOs are a R9.3 billion industry ($1.7 billion) with 645,316 workers, 
accounting for 8.7% of the non-agricultural workforce (Swilling, Russell, and 
Habib 2004). South African CSOs are funded by government (44%), fees (32%), 
and philanthropy (24%), with most of this funding flowing to organizations 
focused on social services (26%), development/housing (18%), and culture/ 
recreation (18%). Most South African CSOs are small, as 80.5% have 10 or 
fewer employees. 
In line with Habib (2005) and Habib and Kotzé (2003), contemporary South 
African CSOs include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-
based organizations (CBOs), and social movements (SMs). First, NGOs operate 
programs in line with donor priorities (Warshawsky 2013, 2014). Funded by 
private donors and located in white, upper-middle class communities, NGOs 
have budgets over $50,000 per month and at least 15 full-time staff. Due to their 
visibility and long institutional histories, NGOs are well-positioned to access 
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corporate funding as a way to compensate for inadequate or inefficient public 
funding (Friedman, Hudson, and Mackay 2008). Second, CBOs operate basic-
need programs (Warshawsky 2013, 2014). Funded by community members and 
located in black, lower-income communities, CBOs have budgets under $1,000 
per month with few if any full-time staff. Since CBOs are dependent on resources 
from community members, their closure rate is high. Third, SMs contest the state 
and capital as a way to promote social, economic, and environmental justice. 
For this reason, they are managed and operated by volunteers, less formalized 
than NGOs or CBOs, and more aggressive in their tactics (Ballard et al. 2006; 
Desai 2002). 
Methods 
To start, I analyzed OH’s annual reports and institutional documents to highlight 
OH’s budget size and composition, program types, and philosophical orientation 
toward programming. Next, I conducted 19 interviews5 with administrators and 
fieldworkers affiliated with OH from 2007 to 2012.6 Although open-ended, inter­
views identified the institutional operations, funding sources, and structure of 
OH. When possible, I went to program sites to examine projects and interact 
with community stakeholders. 
Also, 13 in-depth interviews7 were conducted with key government adminis­
trators, private sector donors, and managers of CSOs affiliated with OH from 2007 
to 2012.8 In these interviews, I examined the institutional collaboration and conflict 
between OH and its partner organizations. Interviews with government adminis­
trators highlighted the motivations behind food policies and state–CSO relations. 
In addition, interviews with private sector donors revealed impetus for supporting 
CSOs such as OH, while interviews with affiliated CSOs provided insight into OH 
from a different place within the organizational delivery network. 
5 In-depth interviews were conducted at institutions 9am–5pm, Monday–Friday. Although 
standard protocol guided interviews, question format was exploratory. Interviews were recorded 
and transcribed with agreement from the interviewee. All interviews were cited in the same 
manner (interviewee role, institution, date). As multiple interviews were completed on the same 
day, many interviews have the same interview date. Interviews were edited for grammatical 
clarity when necessary. 
6 This time period allowed for analysis of OH’s institutional instability across different staff 
tenures and years after the 2008–2009 global recession. 
7 See note 5. 
8 See note 6. 
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Following completion of these interviews, data were transcribed, collated, 
and classified by interviewee type, organization, and quotation content. Then, 
interviews were analyzed with a methodological triangulation which positioned 
interviews in relation to the comments made by other people within similar roles 
at other institutions (Miles and Huberman 1994). In line with Mitchell (1983), 
Sayer (1992), and Yeung (1997, 2003), interview data were analyzed to generalize 
about the causal mechanisms and power relations reproducing perpetual insti­
tutional crisis at OH. 
Operation Hunger: institutional history, mission, 
structure, and programs 
Since 1980, OH has been headquartered in Germiston, Gauteng, near Johannesburg 
(Figure 1). OH currently serves 19,193 people across South Africa’s nine provinces 
through programs which nourish the poor and sharpen their entrepreneurial and 
Figure 1: The headquarters location for Operation Hunger 
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job skills (Operation Hunger 2013a, 2013b). Even though OH’s constitution specifies 
that a board of trustees elects management to run the organization’s daily  opera­
tions, the national, regional, and community offices are led by paid staff and 
numerous volunteers (Operation Hunger 2013a). 
While OH remains an anti-hunger CSO, it changed its institutional mission 
in 1994 to fall under the five-part mission of development, nutrition, relief, 
water, and wellness (Operation Hunger 2008). However, this shift was not 
completely voluntary as CSOs were forced to reinvent their mission following 
key shifts in funding. 
As (the South African) government took over (in 1994), funders from abroad (stated) that 
they would support the (new) democratic government and no longer channel funding to 
NGOs. If NGOs needed funding, they would need to contact the government. So, for many 
NGOs, this was their downfall, because NGOs would not get support if they were repeating 
a government program. Therefore, as OH, when we saw that we were (duplicating govern­
ment programs), we realized that we needed to (broaden our mission). (Administrator, 
Operation Hunger, August 8, 2008) 
Importantly, OH’s mission shift was not sufficient to prevent a substantial size 
reduction in OH’s operating budget (Figure 2). OH’s budget has shrunk from 
R84,092,6649 in fiscal year10 1989–1990 to R6,709,05811 in fiscal year 2011–2012, 
although the operating budget was as low as R2,686,78812 in fiscal year 2003– 
2004. While OH once received substantial donations from a range of donors, 
these streams of money permanently stopped during the mid-1990s. In the 2011– 
2012 fiscal year, OH’s operating budget was comprised of large funding from 
domestic food corporations such as the SPAR Group (R1,500,00013) and domes­
tic and international government agencies, such as the South African Lottery 
(R2,800,00014), Irish Aid (R1,200,00015), and USAID (R373,00016). As is dis­
cussed in the following section, funding inconsistencies are centrally related 
to OH’s current budget crisis. 
9 Figures compiled from key publications (Operation Hunger 1996, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
 
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 and interviews 2007–2012). All Rand values are constant inflation
 
adjusted values based on the 2011 exchange rate of R7.26 to $1.
 
10 Fiscal year is April 1–March 31.
 
11 See note 9 for constant Rand value normalization.
 
12 Ibid.
 
13 Ibid.
 
14 Ibid.
 
15 Ibid.
 
16 Ibid.
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Figure 2: The 1980–2012 operating budget for Operation Hunger 
Operation Hunger: institutional crises 
OH has faced major institutional challenges during its existence. The first 
series of crises started in the early 1990s when high-level OH administrators 
misappropriated money for personal gain (Administrator, Operation Hunger, 
June 3, 2009). Those responsible for the misdeed were fired; however, the 
subsequent lack of institutional legitimacy resulted in reduced funding for 
years. 
In 1992, there was fraud in Operation Hunger. It involved some of the senior people. They 
set up a mill that didn’t exist that fed maize and stuff to a village. It was over a million 
Rand that had gone into different directions. In addition, the board at that time did not do 
a proper full police investigation, and so it looked like a cover up. So, a number of the 
donors started querying things. (Administrator, Operation Hunger, June 3, 2009) 
In addition, the timing of this fraud crisis was particularly poor, as donors began 
channeling their money away from CSOs once apartheid ended (Administrator, 
Operation Hunger, August 8, 2008). 
(With the end of apartheid) in 1994, many donors stopped giving to NGOs and gave to 
government. That hit Operation Hunger quite hard (since we were already dealing with the 
fraud crisis). It has taken quite a long time to get the debt written off, with lots of 
negotiations. (Administrator, Operation Hunger, June 3, 2009) 
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Arguably, OH was able to successfully negotiate itself through these crises by 
ensuring stronger internal governance procedures and recasting its mission as a 
development CSO. In addition, OH has produced annual reports and in-depth 
audited financial reports yearly since the crisis to ensure organizational trans­
parency and accountability.17 While it is unquestionable that OH has never 
reclaimed the funding it had before these crises in the 1990s, it had recovered 
its reputation as a legitimate organization by the late 1990s–early 2000s.18 
However, by 2012, OH was facing the prospect of severe program reductions 
or even closure. There are a number of reasons for OH’s current existential crisis. 
Most fundamentally, OH has struggled to find donors interested in funding its 
mission, since many donors see OH as a feeding organization only. 
I must tell you that most donors don’t give direct feeding money. What they will do; 
however, is that they will give money for (what they see as development projects, so) we 
seldom do handouts. In the old days, you had a truckload of stuff, and you just handed out 
food. (Administrator, Operation Hunger, March 12, 2009) 
Finding donors has been a bit of a challenge. There are still very few who have an interest 
in funding those organizations who work on malnutrition. (Administrator, Operation 
Hunger, August 6, 2012) 
This has been especially difficult, since donors often believe government is the 
purveyor of welfare programs and supplemental CSOs like OH which fill gaps in 
state services are simply redundant or competing with these services (Young 
2000, 2006).19 
Most donors think that (government grants) are somehow addressing households’ basic needs. 
But, is that adequate enough for them to survive for a month? I don’t think so. Our programs 
are coming in to bridge that gap. (Administrator, Operation Hunger, August 6, 2012) 
Although OH attempts to rebrand itself through word-of-mouth and its annual 
reports, OH does not actually have any full-time marketing staff. This has 
reinforced its visibility problem and thus worsened its already existing funding 
problems: 
One of the main challenges we are facing (as an organization) is marketing and (this is 
because) we don’t have the funding to have an actual (marketing) person. Nobody knows 
17 Although unevenly regulated, the state has required CSOs to report their financials since
 
1997.
 
18 This fact has been cross-checked with numerous CSOs.
 
19 The South African government spends more than R118 billion yearly on welfare (South
 
African Treasury 2009).
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about OH sometimes. I mean some people say “OH are you still there?” (Administrator, 
Operation Hunger, August 6, 2012) 
Even when donors support OH’s projects, donors typically loathe to fund admin­
istration costs. This has resulted in poorly trained fieldworkers and community 
members, and eventually projects suffer: 
One of the challenges at OH is limited training, because of the lack of funds. Our (projects) 
work, because we train participants on the ground. Donors often don’t want to cover 
administrative costs and salaries. (Administrator, Operation Hunger, August 6, 2012) 
While the challenge to cover administrative costs is common across the sector as 
many donors view it as an inefficiency or waste of money (Bebbington, Hickey, 
and Mitlin 2008), it is especially punishing for CSO such as OH which are 
already on the brink of closure.20 
Equally problematic, private funders often want to see the outcomes imme­
diately with measurable results, even though projects are often tied to multiple 
issues or take years to produce results. 
Many (donors) give us funding to tackle only one aspect of the problem in the community. 
(However), you cannot measure whether you have had an impact in that community 
without (long-term funding). They also want to see that you have brought about changes 
in that community. When they cannot see any change, they do not really want to continue 
funding. (Administrator, Operation Hunger, August 8, 2008) 
To offset funding shortfalls and partial service coverage, OH has partnered with 
other food-oriented CSOs. However, this has also resulted in partner CSOs’ 
failures becoming OH’s problems. 
We used to get so much (food from our partner NGOs). We had to take more than one 
vehicle and it was huge, massive amounts. And, slowly, it started to dwindle and then it 
went down completely. (Administrator, Operation Hunger, August 6, 2012) 
In addition, donors, especially government, are supportive of the fast growing 
numbers of NPOs at the expense of OH: 
The mushrooming of NGOs (is a key problem for us, since funders) have to spread 
their resources across and also reduce allocation to those that have been with them 
for a longer period. Unfortunately, for the older NGOs, the focus of donors and 
20 OH’s 10% administrative costs are average compared to similar organizations (Camay and 
Gordon 2001). 
102 D. N. Warshawsky 
government (is to fund these new organizations). (Administrator, Operation Hunger, 
August 6, 2012) 
To maximize its chances at success, OH has tried to “sell” its project ideas to 
government to ensure that the relevant South African departments visualize 
their programming and know OH’s management team. 
The only ways we could make a mark with government is (to show) what we can do. When 
they see the result of our intervention, (they realize that) NGOs can also make a mark in 
terms of community development. There is this mentality in government that government 
(is the one) that can actually address problems. (For this reason), NGOs are ignored. 
(Administrator, Operation Hunger, August 6, 2012) 
These comments reinforce the idea that supplemental CSOs which fill gaps in 
state services are redundant and ripe for cooptation or dissolution (Bratton 1989; 
Young 2000, 2006). As noted by Desai, Maharaj, and Bond (2011) and Bratton 
(1989), the degrading of CSOs is key to reinforcing the state’s legitimacy as the 
key service provider. 
In addition, lack of follow through on government funding is a perpetual 
problem. 
We had money promised to us through the (government funding agency called the) NDA. 
We still have funds outstanding from them. We even had a contract signed and everything. 
(Administrator, Operation Hunger, August 8, 2008) 
(The government) has not called for applications now (for two years). We keep checking 
and they haven’t called (for applications), but they won’t say why and you cannot get an 
answer from them. (Administrator, Operation Hunger, August 6, 2012) 
This is quite concerning as it challenges the notion that there is a place for comple­
mentary CSOs which can actually successfully work with and be funded by govern­
ment (Young 2000, 2006). Moreover, it remains unclear to what extent the South 
African state  views CSOs as being  anything  other than adversarial  (Bond 2006).  
The lack of government funding would not be a death blow to OH; however, 
OH has been unable to secure funding from any sector. Private donors support 
OH in smaller amounts than ever before in their institutional history. Donor 
concern about OH’s mission calls into the question the long-term fundability of 
food-oriented CSOs like OH. In addition, government funding is often late, 
inconsistent, or directed toward newer CSOs. This has only led to a spreading 
of fewer resources to more organizations. Also, while OH has used managerial 
ingenuity to partner with other relevant CSOs, OH’s problems have sometimes 
been compounded by its weak institutional partners. Clearly, OH’s future is very 
uncertain. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the viability of South African CSOs through the lens of 
OH. In theory, the state promotes policies which institutionalize, legitimize, and 
fund CSOs, private sector funds CSOs, and CSOs complement state programs and 
monitor the state to ensure accountability (Swilling, Russell, and Habib 2002). 
However, the experiences of OH suggest that these dynamics have only been 
partially realized. OH is now on the brink of closure, due to lack of long-term 
donor support for welfare programs or human capital, ineffective state funding, 
and competition from state programs and new CSOs. Although some of these 
problems may be specific to OH, data in this paper support claims from other 
studies which indicate that lack of resources and weak or antagonistic relation­
ships with partner organizations result in institutional instability among CSOs 
(Swilling, Russell, and Habib 2002), inadequate CSO service delivery 
(Warshawsky 2014), and ineffectual social movements (Ballard et al. 2006). If 
OH, an organization with a long-standing in South Africa, closes, the prospects 
for other CSOs with similar historical backgrounds and circumstances may be 
uncertain. 
As noted by scholars, CSOs maximize their autonomy by keeping a low 
profile, selective collaborations, increasing membership fees, and growing pri­
vate fundraising (Bratton 1989; Salamon 1999; Smith 2012). However, as noted 
through the case study of OH, this is not easily achieved, as OH has found its 
autonomy limited by its low or misunderstood profile due to the fraud crisis 
from the 1990s and its representation as a “welfare” organization. In addition, 
the success of its institutional collaborations has been mixed as its funders and 
partner NGOs have not always come through with results. Also, while OH is 
reluctant to implement membership fees due to the fragility of its partners, OH 
has pursued private fundraising and corporate partnerships. However, without 
human resources or time to network or market their organization, OH has been 
unable to access significant private resources. Although scholars have high­
lighted the risks of CSO commercialization as mission is often compromised at 
the expense of institutional self-perpetuation (Grønbjerg and Salamon 2012; 
Salamon 1993, 2012; Young, Salamon, and Grinsfelder 2012), administrators at 
OH are keen to remarket their organization to ensure its financial sustainability. 
In this way, self-perpetuation concerns are viewed as secondary to financial 
sustainability. 
Most importantly, CSO autonomy is often limited by the state, private sector, 
and other CSOs. Foremost, this includes state control through monitoring, 
organization cooptation, and state penetration as the state actively seeks to 
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control potentially adversarial or competitive CSOs (Bond 2006; Bratton 1989; 
Wolch 1990). In the case of OH, government decisions not to fund OH projects, 
identify OH programs as in competition with state programs, fund “develop­
ment” oriented CSOs or new CSOs only, and not provide promised funding, have 
collectively hurt OH. In addition, corporations have the potential to influence 
the mission or stability of CSOs (Bond 2008). As noted in this paper, private 
donors have influenced OH’s mission to become more developmental in order to 
receive funding; yet, they continue to mandate that money be spent on certain 
programs or for shorter time periods than needed. Lastly, competition from new 
CSOs has increased competition for funding (Mohan 2002), as state and private 
funders have chosen to fund newer upstart CSOs over long-standing CSOs 
like OH. 
In all, these trends point to broader challenges for South African CSOs. 
While some CSOs in South Africa have developed creative ways to access 
funding as noted above, it is uncertain whether funding streams are consistent 
or sufficient to sustain CSOs. Building on the work of Bond (2006) and Habib 
and Kotzé (2003), I argue that CSOs’ polarization and institutional instability is 
not simply the result of restricted CSO autonomy (Swilling 2002). Rather, the 
struggles of South African CSOs, such as OH, reflect CSOs’ financial and political 
dependencies on the state and private sector. 
Using the influential heuristic developed by Young (2000, 2006), South 
African CSOs can be understood as either adversarial (in opposition), supple­
mentary (in addition), or complementary (in cooperation) to the state. In South 
Africa, adversarial CSOs played a key role in destroying apartheid and have 
continued to actively pressure the state, with no sign of diminishing (Ballard et 
al. 2006; Desai 2002). Supplementary and complementary CSOs have always 
been part of the South African social fabric, with the growth of complementary 
CSOs notable in the post-apartheid years as the state has funded many CSOs 
(Swilling et al. 2004). Importantly though, OH’s struggles may be indicative of a 
weakening supplementary CSO sector, as the central state has actively funded 
certain complementary CSOs at the expense of some supplemental CSOs. This 
has been compounded by private donors’ move away from many South African 
supplemental CSOs and increased competition from the growing number of 
supplemental CSOs. Overall, this suggests that South African democratization 
may have simultaneously produced new opportunities for some CSOs, yet rein­
forced unequal power relations for other CSOs and thus produced a highly 
polarized CSO landscape. 
To maximize OH’s viability, OH should hire skilled staff to pursue funding 
and development opportunities, institutional partnerships, and marketing pro­
motions in different sectors both domestically and abroad. Domestic and 
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international donors can also enable the success of CSOs like OH by reducing 
limits on administrative spending, allow more time to implement projects, and 
recognize the value in food-oriented CSOs like OH. Most importantly, the South 
African state should increase funding to more CSOs, embrace CSOs which 
supplement government programs, and pay CSOs on time. While one should 
not exaggerate the potential of CSOs to effect social change or achieve develop­
ment goals (Born and Purcell 2006; Mohan and Stokke 2000) and must not 
romanticize CSOs as post-political institutions (Bebbington, Hickey, and Mitlin 
2008; Ferguson 2006), CSOs like OH make significant impacts when they operate 
at their maximum effectiveness. 
While OH may operate for a few more years, it is unlikely that OH will 
persist for multiple decades unless it can secure long-term funding. If CSOs 
like OH close their operations, pressure on the state may intensify to fill these 
gaps. To some extent, this has already been seen as social protest and 
political instability have increased in the lead up to the 2014 general elections 
(Hart 2014). In addition, although the South African state spends 14% of GDP 
or R118 billion yearly on welfare (South Africa National Treasury 2009), one of 
the highest rates in the Global South (World Bank 2008), pressure on the state 
to increase social welfare spending continues to persist (Desai, Maharaj, and 
Bond 2011). It is unclear that these expectations can be met in the coming 
decade, as poverty and social inequality endure (Desai, Maharaj, and Bond 
2011; Hart 2014) 
To examine whether OH reflects the experiences of other CSOs, future 
studies should analyze the web of institutional relationships which shape how 
CSOs operate in particular contexts. While some CSOs prosper due to their 
connections to global flows of information, money, and support (Bond 2008; 
Warshawsky 2011), other CSOs lack the capacity or knowledge to strengthen 
their institutions or serve their communities (Swilling, Russell, and Habib 2002; 
Warshawsky 2014). Importantly, future research could highlight the institutional 
choices available to CSOs in different socio-political contexts. 
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